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McMULLIN, Irene. Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social
Relations. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013. xiii + 298pp.
Cloth, $99.95. Paper, $34.95—A common and widely shared criticism of
Heidegger’s account of the human, even by those who are sympathetic and
largely approving of his account, finds it inadequate with regard to social
relations. The criticism takes various shapes—that Heidegger’s view of
Dasein is solipsistic, that his account makes sense of the “we” but fails to
account for the “I-Thou (you), that relations to others are inevitably
inauthentic, that the individuality of the other is lost in the anonymity of an a
priori category, and so on. Irene McMullin ably defends Heidegger’s
account both by directly addressing the criticisms and by providing a
detailed and nuanced reading of “Heidegger on social relations.”
This work relies almost entirely on the so-called early Heidegger, the
Heidegger of Being and Time. Her account usefully draws also on Basic
Problems of Phenomenology, The Essence of Human Freedom, The History
of the Concept of Time and a few other early works. From the later works
The Zollikon Seminars are important for her interpretation. McMullin reads
Heidegger as a transcendental phenomenologist who is deeply indebted to
Husserl and also to Kant. She asserts that Heidegger was not as narrowly
focused on the human theoretical capacity as were Husserl and Kant, but she

also asserts that “Heidegger is a phenomenologist in the same scientific way
Husserl was.” She thinks that the difference between the early and the later
Heidegger is often overstated, though this claim is not developed or
important to the book (other than the usage of The Zollikon Seminars to
occasionally illuminate her interpretation). One can see how her approach
to Heidegger relies on the work of Steven Crowell, though her account of
sociality and intersubjectivity in Heidegger, goes beyond what he has done
in this regard.
At the very beginning of the book she acknowledges that Heidegger
failed to fully develop his position and adds that she will not speculate on
why this is so. She also acknowledges more than once that Heidegger can
be found to be inconsistent in his treatment of this phenomenon. She
develops explicitly what she takes to be implicit in Heidegger’s account.
Her interpretation is advanced by way of dealing with the major criticisms of
Heidegger in this regard. She takes on Dreyfus, Searle, Sartre, Levinas,
Nancy, Theunissen, Blattner, among others. Of these, the most important
are Sartre and Levinas. McMullin wishes to show that Levinas’ account of
the relation to the other is not as different from Heidegger’s account as
Levinas would have us see. At the heart of McMullin’s account of the
sociality of Dasein is the temporality of Dasein. She does not rely merely

on sketchy account of “being-with” (Mitsein) that Heidegger provides but
shows how our being-with-another pervades and is relevant to the other
basic structures of Dasein, especially discourse and conscience but most
importantly time and temporality. The book is more ambitious than merely
to show how ‘social’ the human is. It also attempts to show how
Heidegger’s account provides an understanding of the origins of normativity
and the basis for respect, that is, an ethics.
The work begins with a discussion of “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit) in
which she attempts to find a middle way between Dreyfus and Searle with
regard to self-awareness—a way less propositional than Searle and more
normative than Dreyfus. The argument then moves on to consider the
criticisms of Sartre, Levinas, and Theunissen. She argues that in the
encounter with things and persons in the world “the order of precedence
prioritizes the inaugural encounter with concrete foreign temporalities.” She
rejects the view that there is a priority in Heidegger’s account to the
encounter with things. What the other brings to one is another view of the
world and another temporality. According to McMullin, injustice is for
Heidegger the insistence on “my time… my now.” She shows how one can
be a conscience for others. She argues that the everyday worldly modes of
being are not inherently fallen but display a tendency toward inauthenticity.

She resists a decisionistic interpretation of Heidegger’s ethics by pointing to
the significance of receptivity, passive activity and the middle voice for
Heidegger’s account of action.
There is much more to McMullin’s account of the human encounter of
one another and her treatment of the extensive literature on this topic than
can be discussed here. It is the fullest account and best defense of Heidegger
in this regard that I have seen. Because the ‘social’ and ‘justice’ are themes
of the book, a reader might expect some discussion of the political
dimension of human life, but there is no reference to the political, no
discussion of the significance of the hero, and no reference to the distinction
of the social and the communal (at the cost of the ‘social’) that Heidegger
makes toward the end of Being and Time. –Robert J. Dostal, Bryn Mawr
College.

